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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
a final judgment of conviction and sentence entered against 
appellant Barry Sussman (―Sussman‖) on October 8, 2009.  The 
government initiated this criminal case on May 12, 2008, when 
  3 
it filed a complaint against Sussman in the District Court.  The 
charges stemmed from an underlying civil action in which the 
Federal Trade Commission (―FTC‖) secured a judgment against 
Sussman and his co-defendants in the amount of $10,204,445, as 
well as equitable relief by reason of their abusive debt collection 
activities.  On December 9, 2008, a grand jury in the District of 
New Jersey returned a two-count indictment against Sussman in 
these criminal proceedings.  After a five-day trial in May 2009 
the jury found him guilty on one count of theft of government 
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and one count of 
obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).  On 
October 5, 2009, the District Court sentenced Sussman to an 
imprisonment term of 41 months on each count, to be served 
concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release.  The 
Court also imposed a $15,000 fine and a $200 special 
assessment.  The Court entered a judgment of conviction and 
sentence reflecting the sentence it imposed on October 8, 2009.   
 On October 15, 2009, Sussman filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  He now challenges the jury‘s verdict on insufficiency of 
the evidence grounds.  In an alternative argument Sussman 
contends that he should be afforded a new trial because a 
portion of the trial transcript is unavailable, apparently because a 
court reporter lost the transcript.  He also contends that the 
District Court erred in admitting redacted documents from the 
FTC‘s prior civil case against him into evidence.  Finally, he 
argues that the District Court improperly instructed the jury on 
the elements of Count Two, obstruction of justice, and failed to 
include his proposed ―theory of defense‖ instruction in its jury 
charge.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.   
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 On May 12, 2003, the FTC brought the civil action to 
which we have referred against certain defendants, including 
Sussman, Check Investors, Inc., a company he controlled, and 
another one of Sussman‘s companies, pursuant to section 13(b) 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and 
section 814(a) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1692l(a).  In the civil action the FTC sought a 
temporary restraining order (―TRO‖) to safeguard certain assets 
the defendants held so that they would be available for 
satisfaction of any judgment that it might obtain.  The district 
court
1
 granted the TRO and included an asset freeze provision 
prohibiting the ―[o]pening or causing to be opened [of] any safe 
deposit boxes titled in the name of any Defendant, or subject to 
access by any Defendant.‖  App. at 619.  On August 14, 2003, 
the district court granted a preliminary injunction that continued 
the freeze on the defendants‘ safe deposit boxes in the civil 
action.  App. at 184.  On July 18, 2005, the district court issued 
a final order granting a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
defendants from participating in debt collection activities and 
entitling the FTC to judgment against the defendants in the 
amount of $10,204,445.  App. at 679-81.  The final order 
required the FTC to use the proceeds recovered on the judgment 
for equitable relief to the victims of the defendants‘ wrongdoing 
and then to transfer any remaining funds to the United States 
                                                 
1
 The civil and criminal cases against Sussman took place in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  For 
clarity, we only will capitalize District Court when referring to 
the criminal case.    
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Treasury as equitable disgorgement.  App. at 689.  The order 
provided that ―Defendants shall have no right to challenge the 
FTC‘s choice of remedies or the manner of distribution.‖  App. 
at 689.  Under the section of the order entitled ―Turnover of 
Frozen Assets,‖ in recognition that Sussman owned certain gold 
coins in a safe deposit box in the Bank of New York (―BNY‖) 
branch in Secaucus, New Jersey, the order stated:  
Bank of New York shall, within five (5) business 
days of receiving notice of this Order by any 
means . . . transfer to the FTC or its designated 
agent . . . 314 $20 gold coins, 55 1 oz. Austrian 
Philharmonic gold coins, and 65 1 oz. Krugerrand 
gold coins contained in safe deposit box number 
025-0003383 located at Bank of New York, 
Branch #250, 1 Harmon Plaza, Secaucus, New 
Jersey.  
App. at 691. 
 Four days later, on July 22, 2005, in a letter to the bank‘s 
legal process department, the FTC ―request[ed] that the Bank of 
New York maintain the [Secaucus] safe deposit box as a frozen 
account until such time as [the FTC] provide[d] [the bank] with 
further instructions for the transfer of its contents to the FTC.‖2  
                                                 
2
 Due to the fluctuating price of gold, the FTC wanted to wait 
until the completion of the civil appellate process before 
liquidating the coins.  Evidently it was concerned that if it 
liquidated them it might later need to return them after 
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App. at 722 (emphasis in original).  Significantly, although 
Sussman appealed from the final order, he did not seek a stay of 
the order, and none ever was entered.         
 On September 6, 2007, we affirmed the district court‘s 
final order in the civil case.  FTC v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 
F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2007).  Sussman petitioned for rehearing but 
on February 6, 2008, we denied this petition.  On the day that we 
denied Sussman‘s petition for rehearing, he emailed two of his 
attorneys and informed them that the Bergen County Sheriff‘s 
Office had seized the contents of a Bank of America safe 
deposit box (―BOA box‖) that he rented in Fort Lee, New 
Jersey, to enforce a default judgment against him obtained by a 
Texas creditor.  Appellant‘s br. at 9-10.  Like his Secaucus safe 
deposit box (―BNY box‖), the Fort Lee BOA box was subject to 
the district court‘s freeze order in the underlying FTC civil 
action requiring that the bank turn over its contents to the FTC.  
According to one of his attorneys, Sussman ―was agitated 
because he felt that the FTC had not protected his interest in the 
coins. . . . [H]e felt that he was in a race with the Texas creditor 
to get to the [BNY] box‖ inasmuch as the creditor in his view 
already had some control over the BOA box.  App. at 361.  
Sussman‘s attorneys told him not to try to gain access to the 
BNY box.
3
      
                                                                                                             
reacquiring them at another price if Sussman was successful on 
an appeal from the judgment in the civil case.  App. at 202.     
 
3
 As of October 1, 2006, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank purchased the 
assets, deposits, and bank branches of the Bank of New York.  
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 On February 7, 2008, a day after he advised Sussman not 
to enter the bank one of his attorneys, David Shapiro, spoke with 
Sussman and found his client still to be ―agitated.‖  Sussman 
continued to view the situation as ―a race to the bank, a race to 
the box.‖  According to Shapiro, Sussman ―want[ed] to protect 
the coins because of his interest and the government‘s interest.‖ 
 App. at 365.  Later that day, Sussman entered BNY‘s branch in 
Secaucus to gain access to his safe deposit box.  But the BNY 
box had a sticker on it that said ―refer to manager,‖ and the bank 
file indicated that the box must ―remain[] held and frozen 
indefinitely.‖  Appellee‘s br. at 3.  BNY personal banker Dora 
Texeira spoke with lead teller Emma Dos Santos, who informed 
her ―that in the past it had been a problem with the box, and that 
Mr. Sussman could not have access.‖  App. at 264.  Texeira 
asked Sussman whether he had had any problems in the past 
with the box, and he responded: ―Yes, I did, but my lawyers are 
taking care of it.‖  App. at 265.  Texeira understood his response 
to mean ―that everything was okay now, that now he could have 
access to the box.‖  App. at 265.   
 Texeira investigated the matter further but was unable to 
get a firm answer to the question of whether Sussman could 
have access to the BNY box.  The bank‘s legal department left 
the final decision with respect to access to personnel at the 
branch, and Assistant Branch Manager Luna Williams decided 
to grant Sussman access.  Appellant‘s br. at 9.  Sussman took the 
box into a private room and emptied all of the gold coins into his 
briefcase.  He then returned the empty box and left the bank 
                                                                                                             
App. at 228.  Nevertheless, for the sake of consistency, we will 
refer to the Secaucus bank as ―BNY.‖ 
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with the coins.  Sussman later told his attorneys not to inform 
the government that he had removed the coins.  App. at 374.  In 
an email, Sussman wrote: ―Quite a hall‖ [sic: haul], and ―I think 
we should do absolutely nothing.  Let the [creditor] in Texas 
enjoy his windfall as we will ours.‖  App. at 378.      
 The bank subsequently realized that it had made a 
mistake when it allowed Sussman to have access to the box and, 
accordingly, contacted the FTC and advised it of what had 
happened.  The FTC then initiated an investigation into the 
matter and notified the Postal Inspection Service about the 
missing coins.  Postal Inspector Jeffrey DeFuria then obtained a 
search warrant for the box.  He executed the warrant on April 
14, 2008, at which time he discovered that Sussman had 
removed the coins.  This discovery led the government to charge 
Sussman in a criminal complaint on May 12, 2008, with the 
theft of the coins and obstruction of justice.  Notwithstanding 
the initiation of the criminal proceedings Sussman retained the 
coins for almost seven more months before returning them.   
 On October 2, 2008, at the request of Steven Lacheen, 
another one of Sussman‘s attorneys, the United States 
Attorney‘s Office convened a meeting with DeFuria and other 
representatives from the government.  Lacheen informed the 
government‘s representatives that his client had control of the 
gold coins.  Nearly six weeks later, on November 10, 2008, the 
United States Supreme Court denied Sussman‘s petition for a 
writ of certiorari in the underlying civil case.  See Check 
Investors, Inc. v. FTC, 555 U.S. 1011, 129 S.Ct. 569 (2008).  By 
denying Sussman‘s petition, the Court left standing the district 
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court‘s permanent injunction and final order entitling the FTC to 
judgment against Sussman and his co-defendants.  Three days 
later, on November 13, 2008, the United States Attorney‘s 
Office sent a letter to Lacheen requesting that ―the gold coins be 
returned to the government immediately.‖  App. at 411.  On 
December 2, 2008, Sussman complied with that request and 
returned the coins.  App. at 412.         
 
III.  JURISDICTION 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 As we have indicated, the government initiated this 
criminal case on May 12, 2008, when it charged Sussman with 
theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and 
obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).   
Under 18 U.S.C. § 641:  
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or 
knowingly converts to his use or the use of 
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another, or without authority, sells, conveys or 
disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing 
of value of the United States or of any department 
or agency thereof, or any property made or being 
made under contract for the United States or any 
department or agency thereof; or 
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same 
with intent to convert it to his use or gain, 
knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, 
purloined or converted-- 
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than ten years, or both . . . . 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a):   
Whoever . . . corruptly, or by threats or force, or 
by any threatening letter or communication, 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to 
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 
administration of justice, shall be punished . . . . 
 a.  Insufficiency of the Evidence and Missing Transcripts  
 Sussman contends that the evidence at the trial did not 
support the jury‘s verdict against him.  Specifically, he argues 
that the coins were not ―money, or [a] thing of value of the 
United States‖ when he removed them from the BNY box, and, 
if anything, he only obstructed a non-judicial ―voluntary 
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agreement‖ between the FTC and BNY.  According to Sussman, 
the parties entered into that agreement when the FTC wrote to 
BNY requesting that the bank keep the coins in the BNY box as 
a frozen account until the FTC gave it further instructions. 
 The scope of our sufficiency of evidence review is 
familiar.  ―We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges 
with particular deference to the jury‘s verdict.‖  United States v. 
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 278 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  In 
conducting our ―highly deferential‖ review, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government as the 
verdict winner and then determine whether any rational trier of 
fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  United States v. 
Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 238 (3d Cir. 2000).  In challenging the 
verdict on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, Sussman bears 
―a very heavy burden.‖  United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 
1243 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 In considering Sussman‘s sufficiency of the evidence 
argument, we recognize that although Sussman moved in the 
District Court under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for 
a judgment of acquittal, he did not contend in his motion that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the 
theory that the coins were not money or a thing of value of the 
United States.  Quite to the contrary, in his motion he conceded 
that ―[t]he FTC had taken custody of the coins‖ and that ―[t]hey 
undoubtedly belonged to the FTC at that point.‖  App. at 339.  
Thus, it would be appropriate for us to hold that Sussman 
waived a sufficiency of the evidence argument on the money or 
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thing of value issue and that the waiver binds him on this appeal. 
 See In re: Diet Drugs, No. 12-1180, ____ F.3d ____, ____, 
2013 WL 310195, at *6 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2013); Tri-M Grp., 
LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011).  But for the 
sake of thoroughness we will review his argument that the coins 
were not ―money, or [a] thing of value of the United States‖ 
when he removed them on a plain error basis.  See United States 
v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 We will find plain error if there is ―(1) an error; (2) that is 
plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.‖  Id.  In the event 
that Sussman meets all three conditions, we have the discretion 
to ―grant relief, but only if the error seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial 
proceedings.‖  United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 With respect to the Count Two obstruction of justice 
charge, Sussman argued in the District Court and has argued 
here that there was no court order that precluded him from 
removing the coins from the safe deposit box and that any 
restraints on him with respect to removing the coins were 
contained in a voluntary agreement between the FTC and the 
bank evidenced in the FTC‘s July 22, 2005 letter to BNY so that 
the obstruction of justice conviction must be reversed.  We will 
review that argument under a sufficiency of the evidence 
standard.
4
   
                                                 
4
 In United States v. Knox, we noted that the Court of Appeals 
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 Finally, to be successful with an argument that because a 
portion of the trial transcript is missing the case ―warrant[s] 
reversal,‖ Sussman must make ―a specific showing of 
prejudice.‖  United States v. Sierra, 981 F.2d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citations omitted).   
1.  ―[M]oney, or thing of value of the United 
States‖ 
 We are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence for the 
jury to find that the coins were ―money or a thing of value of the 
United States‖ at the time that Sussman removed them from the 
BNY box.
5
  On July 18, 2005, the district court granted the 
FTC‘s motion for summary judgment in the civil action and 
entered a ―Final Order for Judgment and Permanent Injunction‖ 
that included the heading ―Turnover of Frozen Assets,‖ which 
                                                                                                             
for the Tenth Circuit held that ―the plain error test and the 
sufficiency of the evidence standard are essentially equivalent 
inquiries.‖  977 F.2d 815, 824 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United 
States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990)), vacated 
on other grounds, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 375 (1993).  As in 
Knox, ―[w]e need not determine the precise boundaries of the 
plain error test since the government fulfilled the more stringent 
[sufficient evidence] standard‖ on both counts.  Knox, 977 F.2d 
at 824. 
 
5
 Arguably this question is legal in nature and is thus subject to 
plenary review.  But even under that standard our result would 
not be different from that which we reach. 
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stated: 
10. In order partially to satisfy the monetary 
judgment set forth in Section 5 of this Order, any 
financial . . . institution . . . that holds, controls or 
maintains accounts or assets of, on behalf of, or 
for the benefit of, any Defendant shall turn over 
such account or asset to the FTC within five (5) 
business days of receiving notice of this Order . . . 
. In particular:   
(a) Bank of New York shall, within five (5) 
business days of receiving notice of this Order by 
any means . . . transfer to the FTC or its 
designated agent (i) all assets held in account 
numbers . . . and (ii) 314 $20 gold coins, 55 1 oz. 
Austrian Philharmonic gold coins, and 65 1 oz. 
Krugerrand gold coins contained in safe deposit 
box number 025-0003383 located at Bank of New 
York, Branch #250, 1 Harmon Plaza, Secaucus, 
New Jersey . . . .  
App. at 709-10.  The final order also provided that any funds or 
assets recovered by the FTC were to be deposited ―into a fund 
administered by the FTC or its agent for equitable relief‖ to 
consumers injured by the defendants and that ―[a]ny funds not 
used for such equitable relief shall be deposited to the U.S. 
Treasury as equitable disgorgment.‖  App. at 708.  Plainly, 
under this order the government‘s interest in the coins was a 
thing of value within 18 U.S.C. § 641 inasmuch as under the 
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order the government had an ownership interest in the coins or 
at least the right to possession or control over the coins.  See 
United States v. Perez, 707 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Mitchell, 625 F.2d 158, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 Thus, it might be thought that this appeal is easily resolvable 
with respect to the money or thing of value question. 
 Yet notwithstanding the clear provisions in the final order 
and the precedents that we cite, Sussman contends that the 
―Final Order in the civil case gave the FTC at most a sort of lien 
(a right to levy) on Mr. Sussman‘s property, not ‗ownership‘ of 
that property.‖  Appellant‘s reply br. at 7.  He then contends that 
the FTC failed to exercise that right as to the coins when it sent 
a letter to BNY asking the bank to make a direct wire transfer 
from certain designated accounts in the bank but also requested 
that it ―maintain the safe deposit box as a frozen account‖ until 
the FTC instructed otherwise.  App. at 722 (emphasis in 
original).  Therefore, Sussman contends that the FTC did not 
take ownership of the box‘s contents and thus the gold coins 
were not ―money, or thing of value of the United States‖ under 
18 U.S.C. § 641 when he removed them.  Furthermore, Sussman 
maintains that by asking BNY to maintain but freeze the BNY 
box, the FTC entered into a ―voluntary arrangement‖ that was 
separate and distinct from the district court‘s final order and 
permanent injunction.
6
  Thus, by Sussman‘s logic, even if we 
                                                 
6
 In ―Defendant‘s Statement of the Evidence under FRAP 
10(c),‖ in which Sussman attempted to reconstruct the trial 
record due to the missing transcripts, the July 22, 2005 FTC 
letter to BNY is described as ―reflect[ing] a voluntary 
arrangement between the bank and FTC, under which the bank 
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conclude that the district court‘s order granted the FTC 
ownership of the coins for the purpose of invoking section 641, 
we should hold that the FTC abandoned that interest when it 
sent the letter asking the bank to maintain but freeze the box.   
 Sussman‘s argument, however, runs into the obvious 
problem that even under his theory the FTC could have retained 
an interest in the coins sufficient to satisfy the section 641 
requirement by renting a separate safe deposit box in the 
Secaucus bank and moving the coins to that box.  It is difficult 
to understand why the FTC‘s determination to allow the coins to 
remain in a frozen box with the intention that Sussman could not 
have access to that box rather than directly holding them at 
another location pending the outcome of the civil action should 
make any difference with respect to resolution of the ownership 
issue.  But Sussman points to United States v. Scolnick, 392 
F.2d 320, 322 (3d Cir. 1968), as support for his argument so we 
discuss that case.  Scolnick was concerned with the seizure by 
the Internal Revenue Service (―IRS‖) of $100,000 in cash found 
in a safe deposit box to which the defendant-appellant Sidney 
Brooks in the criminal action apparently had access and the 
IRS‘s subsequent demand for $100,000 from Brooks in unpaid 
and due taxes.  See id.  The case was triggered when the 
Philadelphia police while searching for stolen jewelry following 
Brooks‘ arrest for the theft discovered the cash in the box when 
executing a search warrant.  The police could not seize the cash 
pursuant to the search warrant issued in the stolen jewelry case, 
so they did not disturb the money in the box, but, instead, 
                                                                                                             
will ‗maintain the safe deposit box as a frozen account‘ . . . .‖  
App. at 729. 
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reported their find to the IRS.  The IRS served an administrative 
Notice of Termination of Tax Year on Brooks as well as a 
demand for $100,000 in unpaid and due taxes.  The IRS then 
served a Notice of Levy, Notice of Federal Tax Lien and Notice 
of Seizure on the bank pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a) which 
expressly applies to ―any person liable to pay any tax [who] 
neglects or refuses to pay.‖  26 U.S.C. § 6331(a).   
 In what we characterized in our opinion as a ―bizarre‖ 
scheme, Brooks and his co-defendants were able subsequently to 
enter the bank and ―rescue‖ the safe deposit box and its contents 
even though as a result of the levy the box had been sealed.  
This rescue led to Brooks‘s indictment and conviction, inter alia, 
for rescuing the box and money contrary to 26 U.S.C. § 7212(b). 
 Brooks appealed from his conviction but on the appeal we 
affirmed, pointing out that the levy effected a seizure of the 
property.  Thus, Brooks unlawfully rescued property owned by 
the United States. 
 Sussman correctly factually distinguishes this case from 
Scolnick by pointing out that in Sussman‘s case, unlike in 
Scolnick, there had not been a levy on the safe deposit box.  He 
thus contends that the basis for our holding in Scolnick that 
property of the United States had been rescued is missing here.  
But Scolnick is inapposite here, for when Sussman removed the 
coins there already was an outstanding court order freezing the 
safe deposit box and its contents whereas in Scolnick the levy 
was crucial for without it the IRS would not have had a claim on 
the contents of the box.  Thus, the fact that ―[w]hen validly 
invoked, [a levy] effects a seizure of the delinquent‘s property 
  18 
tantamount to a transferal of ownership,‖ United States v. 
Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 116 (3d Cir. 1964) (citation omitted), is 
immaterial in this case for the government was not required to 
rely on a levy in order to reach the contents of Sussman‘s safe 
deposit box.
7
        
 The government points to United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 
39 (D.C. Cir. 1993), as a case more germane than Scolnick as 
support for the money or thing of value aspect of the verdict.  
Unlike Scolnick, which involved a charge under a different 
statute than those involved in this case, Milton dealt with a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 641 for taking money or a thing 
of value of the United States.  In Milton, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖) settled an action with CW 
Transport Inc. (―CW‖) regarding employment discrimination.  
CW agreed to make an irrevocable $1 million payment to the 
EEOC, which would make the money available as back-pay 
awards to qualified claimants.  John Milton, the EEOC attorney 
who was administering the settlement, deposited the CW‘s $1 
million check with E.F. Hutton & Company in an account in his 
name and ―such other person designated by the EEOC as EEOC 
Representative for Account Claimants in EEOC vs. CW 
                                                 
7
 Sussman also relies on In re Ashe, an inapposite decision, 
which was a consolidation of four bankruptcy appeals 
―involv[ing] the effect of section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (Supp. III 1979), on 
liens claimed by the Commonwealth National Bank on property 
of a debtor by virtue of confessions of judgment notes.‖  In re 
Ashe, 712 F.2d 864, 865 (3d Cir. 1983).   
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Transport (Case 86C 680C).‖  Milton, 8 F.3d at 41.  E.F. Hutton 
agreed to make payments from the account in accordance with 
Milton‘s written instructions.  Milton took advantage of this 
arrangement to take a percentage of payments that E.F. Hutton 
made at his direction to persons scheming with him who made 
false claims on the fund.  When charged under section 641 
Milton contended that the money he took did not qualify as 
―money . . . of the United States‖ under that section.   
 Milton was convicted of a violation of section 641 and 
appealed, again advancing the argument that he did not take 
money of the United States.  The court of appeals rejected his 
argument reasoning that CW relinquished the money it paid in 
settlement of the EEOC action and E.F. Hutton and Company 
served only as a repository for the funds.  Though the money 
ultimately would belong to legitimate claimants, until they came 
forward, it belonged to the United States.  The court agreed with 
the EEOC that supervision and control over the $1,000,000 was 
the test and that the EEOC exercised both over the E.F. Hutton 
deposit.
8
  See Milton, 8 F.3d at 42; see also United States v. 
Benefield, 721 F.2d 128, 129 (4th Cir. 1983) (―In determining 
whether an interest qualifies as ‗any . . . money, or thing of 
                                                 
8
 The court of appeals acknowledged that the EEOC‘s ‗―intent to 
maintain an ownership interest in these funds‘ [was] not 
reflected in a statute or regulation. . . . [I]t [was] enough that the 
settlement agreement and the arrangements with E.F. Hutton, 
rather than any statute or regulation, reflected the EEOC‘s 
complete supervision and control over the $1 million paid to the 
agency.‖  Milton, 8 F.3d at 44 n.4 (internal citation omitted).  
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value of the United States‘ under 18 U.S.C. § 641, courts have 
identified as critical factors the basic philosophy of ownership 
reflected in relevant statutes and regulations and the supervision 
and control contemplated and manifested by the government.‖ 
(citations omitted)).   
 The court of appeals rejected Milton‘s argument that two 
Supreme Court opinions, United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 
220, 45 S.Ct. 496 (1925), and United States v. Mason, 218 U.S. 
517, 31 S.Ct. 28 (1910), on which he relied (and on which 
Sussman now relies) were contrary to its result .
9
 These cases 
dealt with the initial source and ultimate destination of stolen 
money.  See Milton, 8 F.3d at 42-43.   
 Rather than following those two cases, the court of 
appeals in support of its holding cited and followed its decision 
in Arbuckle v. United States, 146 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1944).  In 
Arbuckle, the manager of the United States Senate‘s restaurant 
was tasked with deposit of the receipts at the restaurant in a non-
government bank.  The manager then could use those funds to 
cover the cost of food and expenses for the restaurant so far as 
the funds were sufficient for that purpose.  The manager, 
however, diverted some of the receipts to himself and thus was 
                                                 
9
  See Milton, 8 F.3d at 42 (discussing Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 
45 S.Ct. 496 (considering whether a person collecting admission 
fees to a sporting event is guilty of embezzlement when he does 
not remit to the government taxes due on the fees), and Mason, 
218 U.S. 517, 31 S.Ct. 28 (dealing with a charge of 
embezzlement of money paid to a clerk of court)). 
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indicted and convicted for embezzlement of money or property 
of the United States.  On appeal from the conviction the court of 
appeals used a supervision and control test to uphold the 
manager‘s conviction.  See Arbuckle, 146 F.2d at 659. 
 Here, BNY was in a position like E.F. Hutton in Milton 
in that it functioned as the repository of the coins just as E.F. 
Hutton was the repository of the money in Milton.  And, like the 
EEOC in Milton, the FTC retained supervision and control of 
the asset when it decided to hold the coins by leaving them in 
the BNY box.  We recognize that the EEOC deposited the 
$1,000,000 in an account in its name, but here the FTC was in a 
similar position because it had a court-ordered monetary 
judgment in its name, enforceable against any and all of 
Sussman‘s assets, including those held by financial institutions 
and it exercised dominion over the coins when it asked BNY to 
freeze the box and thereby hold its contents.  App. at 689-90.   
 Arguing in the alternative, Sussman cites United States v. 
Zwick, 199 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated by Sabri v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 1941 (2004), for the 
contention that even if the coins belonged to the United States at 
the time of the final order, they lost their status as government 
property when the FTC sent its July 22, 2005 letter to BNY.  We 
reject this argument for we cannot conceive that the government 
intended to give up any interest that it might have had in the 
coins when it asked the bank to act as custodian for the contents 
of the box by freezing the box.  Indeed, the government 
obviously had the exact opposite intent as it sent the freeze letter 
to safeguard the government‘s interest in the coins.  Moreover, 
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even if we made an objective rather than subjective intent 
analysis, after writing the letter the FTC retained such control 
over the coins that it cannot be said that it abandoned any 
interest that it had in them.  We also point out that Zwick 
involved an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 666, a statute that 
deals with ―theft or bribery concerning programs receiving 
[f]ederal funds,‖ a provision that Congress enacted in part to 
make up for the shortcomings of 18 U.S.C. § 641, under which 
―the federal government could prosecute only when it could 
establish that the stolen property was property of the United 
States.‖  Zwick, 199 F.3d at 684.  Yet such a prosecution ―often 
was impossible if title had passed before the property was stolen 
or when federal funds were so commingled with non-federal 
funds that the federal character of those funds could not be 
shown.‖  Id.  As a result, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 666 in 
order to address theft, fraud, and bribery involving federal funds 
disbursed to private organizations or state and local 
governments under a federal program.  See United States v. 
Cicco, 938 F.2d 441, 445 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666 was passed in part to address such actions after title had 
passed to the recipient).
10
   
                                                 
10
 Sussman also cites to United States v. Stuart, 22 F.3d 76, 80 
(3d Cir. 1994), which involved the theft of United States savings 
bonds.  In Stuart, we addressed the issuance of substitute bonds 
in the event of theft and agreed with other courts of appeals 
which had held ―[i]n two cases dealing with the retention and 
conversion of savings bonds that had been replaced by the 
government . . . that the bonds become the property of the 
United States.‖  Stuart, 22 F.3d at 80 (citations omitted).  Here, 
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 In any event, the Supreme Court abrogated Zwick by 
extending section 666‘s reach through the elimination of a nexus 
requirement between criminal activity and federal funds.  Sabri, 
541 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 1941.  Regardless of section 666‘s 
reach, the common factual scenarios in prosecutions under that 
section involve private employees and local and state officials 
who steal money from organizations that have received federal 
funding.  Here, the FTC‘s letter to BNY did not transfer title, 
nor were the coins commingled with other funds or property 
within the bank‘s possession.  It is not as if the FTC gave the 
coins to BNY as a federal grant for its own operational benefit.
11 
 
2. ―[T]he due administration of justice‖ 
 There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
                                                                                                             
we are not dealing with facts remotely resembling the issuance 
and substitution of United States savings bonds.   
 
11
 In addition to rejecting for reasons that we explain below 
Sussman‘s premise that the FTC‘s July 22, 2005 letter to BNY 
constituted a voluntary agreement that superseded the district 
court‘s final order, we note that when the FTC wrote the letter it 
acted consistently with the final order by designating BNY as its 
agent as the order stated: ―(a) Bank of New York shall, within 
five (5) business days of receiving notice of this Order by any 
means, including but not limited to via facsimile, transfer to the 
FTC or its designated agent . . . .‖  App. at 710 (emphasis 
added). 
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Sussman interfered with ―the due administration of justice‖ 
when he removed the gold coins from the BNY box and retained 
them for nearly ten months before returning them to the 
government.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), the elements of a 
prima facie case of obstruction of justice are: 
(1) the existence of a judicial proceeding; (2) 
knowledge or notice of the pending proceeding; 
(3) acting corruptly with the intent of influencing, 
obstructing, or impeding the proceeding in the 
due administration of justice; and (4) the action 
had the ‗natural and probable effect‘ of interfering 
with the due administration of justice.  
In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 317 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 1997)).  On 
appeal, Sussman specifically takes issue with whether the 
evidence was sufficient to prove elements (1) and (4).
12
  
According to Sussman if he interfered with anything it was only 
with a ―voluntary agreement‖ between the FTC and BNY 
established when the FTC sent its July 22, 2005 letter to BNY‘s 
                                                 
12
 Sussman always has maintained with respect to the second 
obstruction of justice element that he was holding the coins for 
safekeeping until the completion of the appellate process in the 
civil case.  If ―[t]he government won, the coins were going to 
the government.  The coins, not any substitutes, but the actual 
coins.  And if he won, he would be entitled to keep [them].‖  
App. at 374. 
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legal department asking the bank to maintain the box as a frozen 
account.  He then contends that the agreement does not qualify 
as a ―judicial proceeding‖ under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) and thus 
he could not have violated that section.
13
  App. at 721-22.  
Ironically Sussman‘s attempt to recharacterize the letter as an 
agreement rather than as a proceeding demonstrates that his 
argument with respect to element (4) of an obstruction offense is 
not meritorious.  After all, either he interfered with a judicial 
proceeding in the form of a binding final order from the district 
court by removing the coins necessary for satisfying the 
monetary judgment against him, or he interfered with the 
―voluntary agreement‖ by removing the coins from the BNY 
box.  Under either scenario, the ―natural and probable effect‖ of 
his interference cannot reasonably be disputed.  Therefore, the 
only substantial obstruction issue is whether Sussman interfered 
with a ―judicial proceeding‖ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 
1503(a).    
 Sussman largely relies on a distinguishable opinion, 
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1999), in support 
                                                 
13
 Sussman tries to make an issue by contending that the 
―voluntary agreement‖ referred back to the terms and conditions 
of the district court‘s preliminary injunction, which ordered all 
financial institutions to retain the defendants‘ assets.  In fact, 
however, the so-called ―voluntary agreement‖ clearly was 
carrying out the terms of the final judgment.  In any event, there 
would be no legal significance to Sussman‘s contention even if 
true, because as Sussman notes, the preliminary injunction was 
superseded by the final order, which was in effect when he 
removed the coins from the BNY box.   
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of his obstruction of justice argument.  In Davis the United 
States Customs Service was seeking to infiltrate a mob crew 
through the use of an informant in hopes of building a criminal 
case and later bringing charges.  In the course of our opinion on 
an appeal from an obstruction of justice conviction arising from 
the infiltration we held that a wiretap instituted as part of the 
investigation did not qualify as a ―pending judicial proceeding‖ 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  We reasoned that a wiretap is generally 
part of an investigation being carried out by members of the 
executive—not judicial—branch, even if a district court actively 
is monitoring the procedure.  See Davis, 183 F.3d at 239 (―[A]n 
investigation simpliciter is not enough to trigger § 1503.‖ 
(emphasis in original)).  As support for that result, we pointed to 
other cases dealing with defendants‘ acts of ―intentionally 
interfering with the execution of a search warrant by warning its 
target to conceal or dispose of evidence‖ or obstructing an 
―[i]nvestigation by agents of the Treasury Department ‗or some 
other like instrumentality‘ of the United States‖14 that did not 
come within section 1503.  Id. (citations omitted); see also 
United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) 
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 See also United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (―While it is clear that a grand jury proceeding is a 
recognized part of the judicial proceedings that can be impeded 
or obstructed, it is not the only part of the judicial proceeding 
that is protected by § 1503 from impediments, improper 
influence or obstruction.  Section 1503 employs the term ‗due 
administration of justice‘ to provide a protective cloak over all 
judicial proceedings, irrespective of at what stage in the judicial 
process the improper activity occurs.‖ (emphasis added)).        
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(―[T]he obstruction of an investigation that is being conducted 
by the FBI, or by any similar governmental agency or 
instrumentality, does not constitute a [section] 1503 violation 
because such agencies or instrumentalities are not judicial arms 
of the government ‗administering justice.‘‖ (footnote 
omitted)).
15
   
 Davis and Simmons, however, differ from this case as 
this case does not concern ―some ancillary proceeding,‖ distinct 
from a judicial proceeding ―such as an investigation independent 
of the court‘s . . . authority.‖‘  Davis, 183 F.3d at 241 (citing 
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 
2362 (1995)).  Rather, in this case BNY was maintaining the 
BNY box as a frozen account and thus effectively was holding 
the coins pursuant to a direct court order.  The reality is that 
Sussman is attempting to transform a final judicial order from 
the district court into a non-judicial, voluntary agreement 
between the FTC, an agency within the executive branch of the 
government, and BNY, a private financial institution, so that 
somehow the FTC rather than seeking to enforce the court‘s 
                                                 
15
 Applying 18 U.S.C. § 1503 broadly in the grand jury context, 
we explained in United States v. Simmons that ―Section 1503 is 
a contempt statute.  It was enacted as the counterpart to 18 
U.S.C. § 401, whose reach is limited to conduct occurring in the 
presence of the court.  As such, § 1503 allows punishment of 
actions taken with the specific intent to impede the 
administration of justice.  So long as a defendant has such 
specific intent, he may not circumvent the court‘s contempt 
power by pressing ‗empty technicalities.‘‖  Simmons, 591 F.2d 
at 209-10 (footnotes omitted).   
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order substituted a voluntary agreement for that order.  But we 
reject that argument because without the court order BNY and 
the FTC would not have had the authority to enter into an 
agreement freezing Sussman‘s assets.  Moreover, we are not 
dealing with either an independent FTC investigation or an 
ongoing investigation supervised by the judiciary for when the 
FTC asked the bank to freeze the box by writing its July 22, 
2005 letter, it was carrying out a direct order from the district 
court. 
 In reaching our result we have considered United States 
v. Cohen, 301 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2002), a case in which a Secret 
Service agent stole money seized during the course of two 
investigations.  In both instances, the agent stole the money 
following the seizure of property belonging to suspects.  In the 
first case, the target was arrested and the Service seized 
numerous items from his residence.  In the second case, the 
target was suspected of counterfeiting, and the Service executed 
search warrants at his residence and storage locker.  The latter 
case was at such a preliminary stage that the district court 
granted the agent‘s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close 
of the government‘s case, a disposition with which we were not 
concerned on the appeal.  In the former case we held that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict the agent under 18 U.S.C. § 
1503 for the government failed to ―point[] to a shred of evidence 
showing that the money that was found in the envelope and that 
the [agent] misappropriated had any connection whatsoever to 
any charges that were investigated or considered in the [target‘s] 
matter.‖  Cohen, 301 F.3d at 157.  But Sussman‘s case is 
different for the final court order and injunction explicitly 
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provided for the gold coins to be delivered to the FTC, whereas 
the money in question in Cohen was nothing more than cash 
seized from a suspect‘s residence that he had obtained from an 
undetermined source.   
 Sussman makes the blanket assertion ―that the processes 
authorized by law for the collection of a judgment by a winning 
party are not ‗judicial proceedings‘ within the meaning of the 
case law under 18 U.S.C. § 1503,‖ appellant‘s reply br. at 3, and 
goes so far as to say that ―[t]he government does not deny‖ that 
assertion, id., but he does not offer support for this contention.  
The government, of course, does deny that assertion and points 
to a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in which the court affirmed the application of 18 
U.S.C. § 1503 to defendants who tried to hide assets to prevent 
the government from collecting a fine and restitution payments 
stemming from one of the defendant‘s conviction.  See United 
States v. Frank, 354 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming ―a 
second count of obstructing justice in violation of § 1503 for 
moving, concealing, and refusing to advise law enforcement 
agents of the location of a Chrysler LeBaron . . . with the 
knowledge that a court order had been issued to seize the 
vehicle‖).   
 Moreover, in United States v. Walasek we cited 
approvingly to United States v. Solow in which the court held 
that the section 1503 omnibus provision ―is all-embracing and 
designed to meet any corrupt conduct in an endeavor to obstruct 
or interfere with the due administration of justice.‖  United 
States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 681 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting 
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United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
 Overall we reject Sussman‘s obstruction of justice contentions.   
  3. Missing Transcripts 
 Alternatively, Sussman argues that if we do not reverse 
his convictions on the merits he is entitled to a new trial due to 
missing trial transcripts.  Under the Court Reporter Act, ―[e]ach 
session of the court . . . shall be recorded verbatim,‖ including 
―all proceedings in criminal cases had in open court.‖  28 U.S.C. 
§ 753(b).  Yet here there are no transcripts of the testimony of 
government witness Doreen Madonia, a BNY vice president, or 
of the cross-examination and redirect testimony of government 
witness Gregory Ashe, an FTC attorney involved in the civil 
case.  App. at 725.  To qualify for a new trial, however, 
Sussman must make ―a specific showing of prejudice‖ from the 
absence of the transcripts to ―warrant reversal.‖  United States v. 
Sierra, 981 F.2d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
16
  In 
this regard, we have ―recognized a defendant‘s request for a 
complete transcript only when the defendant has shown a 
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 In Sierra we also noted that ―the absence or presence of the 
same counsel on appeal is but ‗one significant factor‘ to 
consider in determining prejudice‖ when there is a missing 
transcript.  981 F.2d at 126 (citing United States v. Antoine, 906 
F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990)).  But the circumstance that 
Sussman had different counsel at the trial and on the appeal is 
not dispositive as we surely cannot hold that a convicted 
defendant automatically is entitled to a reversal of his conviction 
on appeal if a transcript of portions of his trial is missing.    
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‗colorable need‘ for the transcript.‖  Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 
169, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Karabin v. Petsock, 758 F.2d 
966, 969 (3d Cir. 1985)) (denying criminal defendant‘s request 
for reconstruction of 25-year-old record of voir dire proceeding 
in a trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to death due 
to defendant‘s failure to provide ―concrete claims of error‖).     
 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c) sets forth the 
procedure to follow when transcripts are missing:  
If the transcript of a hearing or trial is unavailable, 
the appellant may prepare a statement of the 
evidence or proceedings from the best available 
means, including the appellant‘s recollection.  
The statement must be served on the appellee, 
who may serve objections or proposed 
amendments within 14 days after being served.  
The statement and any objections or proposed 
amendments must then be submitted to the district 
court for settlement and approval.  As settled and 
approved, the statement must be included by the 
district clerk in the record on appeal.   
This procedure can be satisfactory for ―[o]ften, the reconstructed 
record will enable the appellate court effectively to review the 
relevant issues.‖  Sierra, 981 F.2d at 126 (citations omitted).   
 In this case to address the problem of the missing 
transcripts, the parties followed the Rule 10(c) procedure with 
the District Court involved in the process.  App. at 725-26.  The 
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Court noted that its ―recollection of Mr. Ashe‘s [the FTC 
attorney] testimony [was] not detailed,‖ but it ―reviewed [the] 
trial notes of [Ashe‘s] cross-examination and they contain no 
inconsistencies with the summary of the cross-examination as 
set forth in Mr. Goldberger‘s [Sussman‘s appellate counsel] 
submission filed November 15, 2011.‖  App. at 725.  The Court 
added: ―The government‘s objections to Mr. Goldberger‘s 
account do not appear to be a material correction.‖17  App. at 
725.  The Court only had trial notes of Madonia‘s direct 
testimony, but the notes were consistent with Sussman‘s 
submission, ―supporting a conclusion that his summary is 
accurate.‖  App. at 725-26.       
 We note that Sussman contends that a transcript of 
Ashe‘s re-redirect testimony is missing but there is some dispute 
as to whether Ashe even was questioned on a final re-redirect 
examination in the District Court.  Sussman‘s own supplemental 
submission to the District Court to complete the missing record 
indicated: 
As with re-cross-examination, neither the bench 
notes nor defense notes refer to re-re-direct as 
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 The government offered two corrections, but the only question 
was whether the FTC designated the bank as an agent to keep 
and maintain the FTC‘s assets.  App. at 733.  Sussman denies 
that Ashe testified to that fact.  Of course, the legal effect of the 
letter is plain on its face when considered in the context in 
which it was written and it is difficult to understand how Ashe‘s 
testimony was needed on that point.   
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having occurred.  The prosecutor‘s notes show 
testimony on re-re-direct concerning Govt Exh. 
G-109 (letter to Shelby Feder in [Bank of New 
York‘s] legal department).  It is not possible to 
reconstruct most of the testimony on re-re-direct, 
as the prosecutor‘s notes say only: ‗G-109 letter to 
Shelby Feder Within 5 Days of Final Order - .‘ 
App. at 738.  Sussman tries to exploit this seemingly contrived 
ambiguity: 
Again, this discussion, the substance of which 
does not appear in any of the notes, would appear 
to be directly pertinent and potentially important 
in terms of Mr. Sussman‘s possible argument on 
whether the contents of the safety deposit box 
constituted a ‗thing of value‘ or property ‗of the 
United States‘ at the pertinent time.   
App. at 738 n.4.  Yet the reconstructed transcript reveals that 
Sussman had the opportunity to cross-examine Ashe on 
Government Exhibit G-109.  App. at 729.  Moreover, based on 
our intensive study of this case we cannot conceive of anything 
that Ashe could have said during re-redirect testimony that 
would have had an impact on the determination of ―the money 
or thing of value‖ issue. 
 Sussman cannot successfully manufacture his own 
disputes, attribute legal significance to them, and then claim that 
they only can be resolved by an examination of testimony that is 
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unavailable because the transcript of the testimony is missing, 
particularly because the missing transcripts already have been 
summarized and submitted through court-supervised 
reconstruction.  The circumstances supporting Sussman‘s claim 
that he has been prejudiced fall far short of those in cases to 
which he cites, including Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160 (3d 
Cir. 1995), a Batson habeas corpus jury selection case.  In 
Simmons v. Beyer, no one could remember how many potential 
African American jurors had been peremptorily challenged and 
the assistant prosecutor from the trial had no recollection or 
notes of why he struck individual venirepersons.  Id. at 1168.  
Thus, in Simmons v. Beyer we were confronted with a case 
involving a missing record dealing with a significant 
constitutional issue in a situation in which there was no hope of 
reconstructing the record.  See id.  We simply could not review 
the Batson claim without knowing ―whether Simmons‘ jury 
selection process was infected by racial discrimination.‖  Id.   
 The Simmons v. Beyer situation is completely inapposite 
here for in this case, unlike in Simmons v. Beyer, ―the 
reconstructed record [has] enable[d us] effectively to review the 
relevant issues.‖  Sierra, 981 F.2d at 126 (citations omitted).  
Here, Sussman does not raise a colorable claim because he fails 
to make a specific showing of prejudice attributable to the 
absence of the transcripts.  Therefore, the circumstance that 
there are missing transcripts does not entitle him to a new trial. 
b.  Redaction  
 In the District Court in a pretrial motion Sussman sought 
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to prevent the introduction of evidence from the civil suit that he 
claimed unfairly would prejudice his defense, in particular the 
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and final 
judgment.  Sussman argued that under Federal Rules of 
Evidence 403 and 404(b), a stipulation with respect to the civil 
action would be sufficient for the government to prove the 
existence of that proceeding so far as necessary in this criminal 
action and that there was no need to introduce these three 
documents from the civil case into evidence in this criminal 
case.  Although there was a stipulation in the criminal case with 
respect to certain aspects of the civil case, these three documents 
and certain other redacted documents from the civil case were 
admitted into evidence in the criminal case.  App. at 45.             
Under Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added):  
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.
[18]
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 We held in United States v. Cross that Rule 403 ―creates a 
presumption of admissibility.‖  308 F.3d 308, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citation omitted).  The ―[e]vidence cannot be excluded under 
Rule 403 merely because its unfairly prejudicial effect is greater 
than its probative value.  Rather, evidence can be kept out only 
if its unfairly prejudicial effect ‗substantially outweigh[s]‘ its 
probative value.‖  Id. (alteration in original) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 
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Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1): 
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person‘s character in order 
to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character.   
The District Court ruled that the documents were critical 
evidence regarding the crucial factor in the case of Sussman‘s 
intent when he removed the coins from the BNY box and that a 
stipulation would be an insufficient substitute because the 
documents potentially spoke to Sussman‘s motivation in 
accessing the safe deposit box.  App. at 180.  With Rules 403 
and 404(b) in mind, the parties worked together under the 
Court‘s supervision to redact the documents before moving 
them into evidence.
19
  Sussman, however, preserved his 
                                                                                                             
403). 
 
19
 The government‘s first witness at the criminal trial was FTC 
attorney Gregory Ashe.  At the beginning of the direct 
examination, the Court told the jury:  
 
What we‘re trying to do is we‘re not trying the 
civil case here.  We want to stay totally away 
from it and involve ourselves in the charges in 
this case.  We have to know what the procedure 
was, and we have to know what the background 
of the documents from which you will decide the 
case is.  But we just want to get into the—we 
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objection to their admission and the Court‘s denial of the use of 
his proposed stipulation that he contended would have obviated 
the need for admission of the documents even as redacted.   
 ―We review a district court‘s decision to admit or exclude 
                                                                                                             
don‘t want to get into the details of the civil case. 
  
App. at 169.   
 
 The government then read the jury the following 
stipulation regarding the FTC‘s civil action:  
 
In May of 2003, the Federal Trade Commission, 
or FTC, filed a civil lawsuit against Barry 
Sussman, the defendant in this case, along with 
two other individuals.  We‘re going to call this the 
FTC action for the remainder of this action.  On 
July 18th, 2005, the FTC won the FTC action, and 
Mr. Sussman and the others were ordered the [sic] 
[to] pay about 10.2 million dollars.  The substance 
is not before you, as the Judge just said.  You may 
see that several documents or exhibits that we will 
look at over the course of the next few days have 
been redacted or marked with blank [sic] [black] 
ink in certain parts, and please do not pay any 
attention to those parts.  Please just focus on what 
you can actually see and read. 
 
App. at 170. 
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evidence for abuse of discretion, and such discretion is 
construed especially broadly in the context of Rule 403.‖  
United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citation omitted).
20
  Sussman argues that the District Court 
abused its discretion when it allowed admission of the 
documents because, even as redacted, indeed particularly as 
redacted, they were prejudicial.  According to Sussman, ―the 
extensive redaction itself was highly prejudicial in its own way.‖ 
 Appellant‘s br. at 31.  He contends that he was especially 
prejudiced ―where the government also presented witness 
testimony concerning the FTC civil action.‖  Appellant‘s br. at 
31 (emphasis added).   
 Sussman supports his argument by citing to Old Chief v. 
United States for the proposition that a court considering a 
defendant‘s offer to stipulate should ―take account of the full 
evidentiary context of the case as the court understands it when 
the ruling must be made.‖  519 U.S. 172, 182, 117 S.Ct. 644, 
651 (1997) (footnote omitted).  Under Old Chief, a trial court 
should not view the disputed evidence in isolation but rather 
should consider the range of evidentiary alternatives available to 
it.  See id. at 182-84, 117 S.Ct. at 651-52.  Yet the Old Chief 
Court explicitly restricted its holding ―to cases involving proof 
of felon status.‖  Id. at 183 n.7, 117 S.Ct. at 651 n.7.  The Court 
added that the abuse of discretion standard ―is not satisfied by a 
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 We recognize that sometimes we exercise plenary review on 
admission of evidence questions involving construction of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, but we are not concerned with such a 
question here.  United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 100 (3d 
Cir. 2004).   
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mere showing of some alternative means of proof that the 
prosecution in its broad discretion chose not to rely upon.‖  Id.  
Here, the prosecution simply chose not to rely exclusively on 
Sussman‘s proposed stipulation, which significantly did not 
include a stipulation as to his intent when he removed the coins 
from the BNY box.  Sussman‘s creative application of Old 
Chief attempts to extend that case‘s holding to an unacceptable 
extent.   
 Sussman also undercuts his argument with the assertion 
that the disputed evidence concerned a ―consequential fact,‖ 
rather than ―an element of the crime charged‖ and therefore is 
particularly suitable for a stipulation.  See United States v. 
Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2011).  In Higdon we drew 
an evidentiary distinction between ―elements‖ and ―facts‖ and 
concluded that a prior conviction was ―an element of the crime 
charged‖ in a case charging a convicted felon with possession of 
a firearm.  Consequently, we held that the district court erred 
when it did not permit a stipulation with respect to the 
defendant‘s prior conviction to be admitted into evidence 
because to obtain a conviction the government had to prove all 
of the elements of the charged offense.  Id. (emphasis in 
original).   
 In our case in its instructions to the jury, the District 
Court appropriately informed the jury that the third element of 
the Count One charge, theft of government property, was ―that 
the Defendant did so knowingly with the intent to deprive the 
United States . . . .‖  Supplemental app. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 The Court explained: ―To act knowingly means to act 
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intentionally and voluntarily with an awareness of what was 
happening, and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident or 
carelessness.  Whether the Defendant acted knowingly may be 
proven by the Defendant‘s conduct and by all of the 
circumstances surrounding the case.‖  Id. at 22.  The second 
element of the Count Two charge, obstruction of justice, also 
included a ―knowledge‖ requirement, and the third element 
required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Sussman intended to influence a pending judicial 
proceeding.  The temporary restraining order, preliminary 
injunction and final order inevitably assisted the jury when it 
considered Sussman‘s intent in removing the coins because they 
set forth the situation that he faced with respect to control of the 
coins and made clear the benefit he could hope to obtain by 
gaining possession of them.
21
  Consequently, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the redacted documents 
to be admitted into evidence and used by the jury during 
deliberations rather than confining the reference to them to a 
stipulation of their existence.         
 In his reply brief, Sussman attempts to bolster his 
redaction argument with a litany of criminal cases in which the 
prejudicial evidence introduced was far more damaging than the 
evidence to which he objects here.  See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 
523 U.S. 185, 197, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1157 (1998) (applying the 
joint trial Bruton prohibition on the introduction of a non-
testifying co-defendant‘s confession naming the other defendant 
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 ―Knowledge‖ and ―intent‖ are also both exceptions under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) permitting the use of the 
defendant‘s prior ―Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.‖   
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to redacted confessions in which the defendant‘s name is 
replaced by an obvious indicator of him); United States v. 
Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
district court erred in admitting a co-defendant‘s redacted 
proffer statements that clearly identified the only two co-
defendants charged with murder as the ones who pulled the 
trigger);
22
 United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 
1997) (―[E]vidence in a murder trial that the defendant 
committed another prior murder poses a high risk of unfair 
prejudice.‖).  But in all of these cases the prejudicial evidence 
was far more damaging to the defendant than the disputed 
evidence admitted here and thus all are of limited utility in our 
analysis.     
c.  Jury Instructions 
 Sussman challenges two aspects of the instructions that 
the District Court gave the jury in both written and oral form 
that in some respects were inconsistent.  First, he argues that the 
District Court incorrectly instructed the jury on the Count Two 
charge of obstruction of justice.  Sussman, however, did not 
preserve an objection to that instruction so we review the 
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 In spite of the district court‘s error in Hardwick, we affirmed 
the defendant‘s conviction due to ―[t]he overwhelming evidence 
convince[ing] us that the District Court‘s error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Hardwick, 544 F.3d at 574 
(citation omitted).  In view of our conclusion that the District 
Court did not err in resolving the redaction issue we do not 
make a harmless error analysis on this appeal on this point. 
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challenge to it for plain error.  See United States v. Lee, 612 
F.3d 170, 191 (3d Cir. 2010).  Second, he contends that the 
Court erred in substituting its abbreviated version of his ―theory 
of defense‖ instruction for his more comprehensive version of 
that instruction.  In most instances, ―[w]e review the refusal to 
give a particular instruction or the wording of instructions for 
abuse of discretion.‖  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 
642 (3d Cir. 2006)(internal quotation marks omitted)).  In 
conducting such a review, ―we consider the totality of the 
instructions and not a particular sentence or paragraph in 
isolation.‖  Id. at 74-75 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
However, we review de novo a district court‘s refusal to give a 
jury instruction on a defendant‘s ―theory of defense‖ when the 
defendant objected at the trial to the court‘s refusal to give the 
instruction.  See United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 124 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 
1. Obstruction of Justice 
 Sussman challenges the instruction that the District Court 
gave on the Count Two charge of ―Obstruction of Justice‖ under 
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).  The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
―Whoever corruptly . . . endeavors to influence, obstruct, or 
impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished . . . 
.‖  18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).  This is the statute‘s ―Omnibus Clause,‖ 
which functions as a catchall provision, and ―is far more general 
in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute‖ covering grand 
jurors and court officers.  United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 
593, 598, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362 (1995).  At trial, Sussman did 
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not object to the Court‘s obstruction of justice instructions, so 
we review the charge for plain error.  See Lee, 612 F.3d at 191.  
―A ‗plain error‘ is one that affects substantial rights,‖ and ―[a]n 
error affects ‗substantial rights‘ if it was prejudicial in that it 
affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings.‖  United 
States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. 
Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that ―the 
error must be egregious or otherwise constitute a manifest 
miscarriage of justice‖ (citation omitted)).  The defendant bears 
the burden of ―establish[ing] that the error prejudiced the jury‘s 
verdict.‖  Ozcelik, 527 F.3d at 96 (citation omitted).  Even ―[i]f 
the defendant satisfies this showing, we may, but are not 
required to, order correction.‖  United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 
192, 211 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 Sussman challenges the District Court‘s jury instructions 
on the likely effect of his action in removing the coins on a 
pending judicial proceeding and his knowledge of that effect.  
More specifically, Sussman contends that the Court failed to 
inform the jury that under Aguilar to convict him on Count Two 
it would have to find that he ―knew that his actions were likely 
to affect the judicial proceedings‖ and that ―it had to find that 
the natural and probable effect of the endeavor would actually 
be to interfere with the due administration of justice.‖ 
Appellant‘s br. at 40-41 (emphasis in original).   
 In support of his argument with respect to the jury 
instructions Sussman provides the following excerpt from the 
District Court‘s instructions on the second and third elements of 
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the obstruction of justice offense charged in Count Two: 
The second element the government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt is the defendant‘s 
knowledge of an official pending proceeding.  
This element requires that the defendant knew 
that such proceeding was pending on February 
7th, 2008.
[23]
  In this regard, you may take into 
account all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the conduct from which the 
defendant is charged in determining whether he 
knew or had a reasonable basis for believing that 
the proceedings was pending. Third and final 
element that the government must prove is that 
the defendant obstructed justice.  To satisfy this 
element, the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant corruptly 
endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the 
due administration of justice with the intent to 
influence the pending judicial proceeding. 
. . . 
The word ‗endeavor‘ means any effort or act, 
however contrived, to obstruct or interfere with 
the pending judicial proceeding.  Success of the 
endeavor is not required to find the defendant 
guilty.   
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 Sussman removed the coins from the BNY box on February 7, 
2008. 
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App. at 543-44. 
 As the government points out, Sussman supplies the 
above section of the jury instructions without acknowledging 
that before giving the specific instructions that we have quoted 
the District Court charged the jury that the government had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt ―that the defendant‘s act was 
done corruptly; that is, that the defendant acted knowingly and 
dishonestly with the specific intent to impede the proceeding in 
its due administration of justice.‖  App. at 541-42.   
 Sussman quotes from our In re Impounded decision, in 
which we noted in a footnote: 
The elements of a prima facie case of obstruction of 
justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 are: (1) the existence of a 
judicial proceeding; (2) knowledge or notice of the 
pending proceeding; (3) acting corruptly with the intent 
of influencing, obstructing, or impeding the proceeding 
in the due administration of justice; and (4) the action 
had the ‗natural and probable effect‘ of interfering with 
the due administration of justice.      
241 F.3d at 317 n.8.  But Sussman overlooks the footnote‘s 
citation to United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 
1997), in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held: 
In order to satisfy § 1503, the government must 
prove that (1) there was a judicial proceeding; (2) 
the defendant had knowledge or notice of the 
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pending proceeding; and (3) the defendant acted 
corruptly with the intent of influencing, 
obstructing, or impeding the proceeding in the 
due administration of justice.     
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  The Collis court was 
referring to Aguilar, in which the Court explained the third 
element was ―a ‗nexus‘ requirement—that the act must have a 
relationship in time, causation or logic with the judicial 
proceedings.  In other words, the endeavor must have the 
‗natural and probable effect‘ of interfering with the due 
administration of justice.‖  Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. at 
2362 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The District Court did 
not have to list the ―nexus‖ requirement as a fourth element, and 
it adequately covered the requirement when it gave the 
following instructions that followed Sussman‘s selected excerpt: 
    
Often that state of mind with which a person acts 
at any given time cannot be proved directly 
because the defendant‘s state of mind can be 
proved indirectly from the surrounding 
circumstances.  One cannot read another person‘s 
mind or tell what he or she is thinking.  Thus, to 
determine a defendant‘s state of mind or what the 
defendant intended or knew at a particular time, 
you may consider evidence about what the 
defendant said, what the defendant did or failed to 
do, and how the defendant acted, and all the other 
facts and circumstances shown by the evidence 
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that may prove what was in the defendant‘s mind 
at that time.  It is entirely up to you to decide what 
the evidence presented during this trial proves or 
fails to prove about the defendant‘s state of mind.  
You may also consider the natural and probable 
results or consequences of any acts that the 
defendant knowingly did, and whether it is 
reasonable to conclude that the defendant 
intended those results or consequences.  You may 
find that you are not required to find that the 
defendant knew and intended the natural and 
probable consequences as a result of acts he 
knowingly did.  This means that if you find that 
an ordinary person in the defendant‘s situation 
would have naturally realized that certain 
consequences would result from his actions, then 
you may find, but you are not required to find that 
the defendant did know, and did intend those 
consequences would result from his actions.  This 
is entirely up to you to decide as finders of the 
facts in this case.  
App. at 544-45.   
 The District Court specifically instructed the jury on how 
to assess Sussman‘s state of mind, including the consideration of 
the likely effect of his actions.   The ―knowledge‖ requirement 
with which Sussman takes issue actually refers to the knowledge 
of a pending judicial proceeding, whereas ―corruptly‖ defines 
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the mens rea for the ―likely to affect‖ component of the 
obstruction.  In his reply brief, Sussman withdrew his challenge 
to the jury instruction on the mens rea element of ―corruptly.‖  
Appellant‘s reply br. at 15 n.12.  Sussman, moreover, twists the 
―natural and probable effect‖ requirement beyond recognition 
when he argues that the jury had to find that ―the natural and 
probable effect of the endeavor would actually be to interfere 
with the due administration of justice.‖  Appellant‘s br. at 41 
(emphasis in original).  Under Aguilar the emphasis is on the 
likely, not actual, impact of the defendant‘s disputed actions.  
Therefore, we do not find that the District Court committed 
error, let alone plain error, in its charge to the jury.
24
  
  2. The Theory of Defense Instruction  
 We have ―established that [a] defendant is entitled to a 
theory of defense instruction if (1) he proposes a correct 
statement of the law; (2) his theory is supported by the evidence; 
(3) the theory of defense is not part of the charge; and (4) the 
failure to include an instruction of the defendant‘s theory would 
deny him a fair trial.‖  United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 
352-53 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Hoffecker, 530 
F.3d 137, 176 (3d Cir. 2008)(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 The District Court ―was bound to give the substance of a 
requested instruction relating to any defense theory for which 
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 Finally, the parties dispute whether the omission of an element 
from the jury instructions constitutes per se plain error.  In light 
of our above finding that the District Court did not commit an 
error at all, we need not address the issue. 
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there was any foundation in the evidence.‖  United States v. 
Blair, 456 F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1972) (citation omitted).  
Sussman proposed his own theory of defense instruction, but the 
District Court delivered a revised version to the jury.  Of course, 
a court does not err merely because it does not give an 
instruction in exactly the words a defendant submits for ―[n]o 
litigant has a right to a jury instruction of its choice, or precisely 
in the manner and words of its own preference.‖  Douglas v. 
Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1233 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).  
In fact, ―[i]t is well settled that there is no error to refuse to 
instruct as counsel wishes if the charge to the jury is correct.‖  
Blair, 456 F.2d at 520 (citations omitted). 
 On appeal, Sussman argues that the District Court‘s 
alternative theory of defense instruction was prejudicial.  He 
requested the following instruction: 
It is the theory of the defense in this case that Mr. 
Sussman, when he took with him the contents of 
[the BNY box] on February 7, 2008, was 
intending to safeguard the coins that were in [the 
box] from seizure by other creditors.  It is asserted 
that since he did not intend to steal the coins or 
violate the terms of the final order, he is not guilty 
of either of the two offenses with which he is 
charged.  Evidence has been presented that the 
event which motivated his actions was the seizure 
by the Bergen County Sheriff in late January 2008 
of the contents of the safety deposit box at the 
Bank of America branch in Ft. Lee.  In Mr. 
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[S]ussman‘s view, if he won his appeal, the coins 
would belong to him.  If he lost the appeal, the 
coins would be available to help satisfy the 
judgment obtained by the FTC.  It is further the 
theory of the defense that Mr. Sussman retained 
possession of the coins only until the appellate 
proceedings had ended without success and then 
made prompt arrangements through his counsel to 
return the coins. 
Unless the government has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Sussman acted with 
criminal intent, or corruptly interfered with the 
judicial process, he must be found not guilty.    
App. at 122.  The District Court‘s written charge, however, 
included the following instruction: 
It is the theory of the defense in this case that Mr. 
Sussman, when he took with him the contents of 
[the BNY box] on February 7, 2008, was 
intending to safeguard coins that were in [the box] 
from seizure by other creditors and was not 
intending to steal, embezzle or knowingly convert 
the coins, or to violate a court order. 
Supplemental app. at 17.  Yet the trial transcript included a 
slightly modified version: 
It is the theory of the defense in this case that Mr. 
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Sussman, when he took with him the contents of 
[the box], was attempting to safeguard coins 
seized by other creditors and not intended to steal, 
embezzle or knowingly convert the coins or 
violate a court order.    
App. at 537.  Both versions of the charge abbreviated Sussman‘s 
requested theory of defense instruction.  Sussman takes 
particular issue with the distinction in the Court‘s two charges 
(Sussman‘s proposed charge related to protection of the coins in 
the Secaucus box that creditors other than the FTC had not 
seized) between coins that were not yet seized by creditors and 
those that already had been seized by creditors. 
 In regard to the written instruction, ―a defendant is not 
entitled to a judicial narrative of his version of the facts, even 
though such a narrative is, in one sense of the phrase, a theory of 
the defense.‖  Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 176 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  In Hoffecker we cited approvingly 
to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit‘s decision in 
United States v. Paradies, in which it found ―that the district 
court was correct in finding that the requested jury charge was 
partisan and that it aspired ‗to place the . . . defendants‘ desired 
factual findings into the mouth of the court.‖  Id. at 177 (citing 
United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1287 (11th Cir. 
1996)(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Here the final 
sentence in Sussman‘s proposed theory of defense instruction 
merely reiterated the intent requirement of the offense, which 
the District Court already had covered in the ―elements‖ sections 
of the jury instructions.  Nevertheless, in the Court‘s theory of 
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defense instruction it did make reference to Sussman‘s intent.  
Moreover, the Court accepted Sussman‘s suggestion to add ―or 
to violate a court order‖ at the end to clarify that the ―theory of 
defense‖ instruction applied to both counts.  App. at 492.  The 
Court, therefore, not only agreed to offer a ―theory of defense‖ 
instruction but also provided one that encapsulated Sussman‘s 
arguments without rehashing the facts established during trial.  
The Court did not err in taking that approach.   
 Yet we cannot gloss over the discrepancy between the 
trial transcript‘s version of the charge and the written version of 
the charge.  The government asserts that the transcript‘s version 
of the instruction does not accurately reflect what the Court said, 
and, in any event, the jurors had copies of the written 
instructions during deliberations.  Appellee‘s br. at 48.  The 
government also claims that Sussman‘s objection was only to 
the ―theory of defense‖ instruction‘s length and not its content.  
Therefore, the government contends that the District Court must 
have read the written version of the charge to the jury and did 
not give the transcript‘s version.  Appellee‘s br. at 49.  But 
Sussman‘s objection to the ―truncat[ed]‖ charge did not indicate 
an unqualified acceptance of the instruction‘s content.  Although 
Sussman‘s objection on the theory of defense instruction 
focused on his proposal of ―a long one‖ and the Court‘s delivery 
of ―a shorter one,‖ he still ―object[ed] to the charge as 
delivered.‖  App at 565.  Of course, it would be expected that 
there would be a correlation between an objection to the length 
and an objection to the content of an instruction, as the former 
objection may encompass the latter objection if the reduced 
length is substantial as it is likely to reflect altered content.   
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 The government‘s argument, moreover, implicitly 
concedes that there was a legal error in the transcript‘s version 
of the instruction because the argument suggests that Sussman 
clearly would have objected to the instruction‘s content if the 
District Court had read the version that the transcript indicates 
that it did.  Furthermore, the government‘s contention that the 
transcript is not accurate does not take into account that in the 
absence of a motion to correct or modify the record under 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e), we ―accept[] as 
accurate the transcript of the district court proceedings.‖  Gov‘t 
of the Virgin Islands v. Paniagua, 922 F.2d 178, 181 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1990) (referencing Fed. R. App. P. 10(e), which states, ―[i]f any 
difference arises about whether the record truly discloses what 
occurred in the district court, the difference must be submitted to 
and settled by that court and the record conformed 
accordingly‖).   
 In the alternative, the government counters that the 
transcript‘s version of Sussman‘s theory of defense, ―while 
inartful, was hardly erroneous or confusing, and the jury could 
have referred to its written copy of the instructions for 
clarification.‖  Appellee‘s br. at 49.  The government supports 
its argument by citing to our decision in United States v. Ozcelik 
in which we took into consideration the fact that ―the jurors had 
copies of the instructions that contained the [proper] word[ing].‖ 
 527 F.3d at 97.  Yet in Ozcelik, we deferred to the district 
court‘s explicit determination that it had read the proper 
instruction to the jury.  See id.  Here, unlike in Ozcelik, the 
government never filed a motion to correct the record, and the 
District Court never addressed the matter.  We also recognize 
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that the law ‗―presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of 
their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial 
court‘s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, 
make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.‖‘  United 
States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 
n.9 (1985)).  
 Nonetheless, the problem with the theory of defense 
charge is not nearly as significant as Sussman claims.  In 
Hernandez, the district court gave the jury conflicting 
explanations of reasonable doubt.  See Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 
734.  We understandably were concerned that the jury returned 
its guilty verdict even though the government might not have 
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id.  Here, if the 
District Court erred in giving the oral theory of defense 
instruction, the error was not of the same magnitude as the error 
in Hernandez.  We also stand by ―the axiom that jury 
instructions must be viewed in their entirety.‖  Id. (citing United 
States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Pine, 609 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Smith, 468 
F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1972)).   
 Taken as a whole, the instructions accurately conveyed 
the direction that the key issue before the jury was Sussman‘s 
intent when he removed the coins as there was no doubt that he 
had done so.  Overall, it was perfectly obvious that Sussman‘s 
theory of defense was that he was protecting the coins in 
Secaucus from seizure of creditors other than the FTC.  
Although the exact status of the coins at the time of removal was 
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in dispute, the key factual issue was whether they constituted 
government property – not whether other creditors had already 
seized them.  Under any standard of review, we do not find this 
slight wording error sufficient reason to overturn the jury‘s 
verdict.                
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence entered October 8, 2009.    
